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ISBN 0-521-84205-0 (hardback) Logic is an ancient discipline that, ever since its inception some 2,500 years ago, has been concerned with the analysis of patterns of valid reasoning. The beginnings of such a study can be traced back to Aristotle, who first developed the theory of the syllogism (an argument form involving predicates and quantifiers). The field was further developed by the Stoics, who singled out valid patterns of propositional argumentation (involving sentential connectives), and indeed flourished in ancient times and during the Middle Ages, when logic was regarded, together with grammar and rhetoric (the other two disciplines of the trivium), as the foundation of humanistic education. However, the modern conception of logic is only approximately 150 years old, having been initiated in England and Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth century with the work of George Boole (An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, 1854), Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879), and Richard Dedekind (Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?, 1888). Thus modern symbolic logic is a relatively young discipline, at least compared with other formal or natural sciences that have a long tradition. Throughout its long history, logic has always had a prescriptive as well as a descriptive component. As a descriptive discipline, logic aims to capture the arguments accepted as valid in everyday linguistic practice. But this aspect, although present throughout the history of the field, has taken up a position more in the background since the inception of the modern conception of logic, to the point that it has been argued that the descriptive component is no longer part of logic proper, but belongs to other disciplines (such as linguistics or psychology 
Foreword
and foremost, a prescriptive discipline, concerned with the identification, analysis, and justification of valid inference forms. The articulation of logic as a prescriptive discipline is, ideally, a twofold task. The articulation first requires the identification of a class of valid arguments. The class thus identified must have certain features: not just any class of arguments will do. For instance, it is reasonable to require that the logical validity of an argument depends on only its logical form. This amounts to requiring that the class of valid argument be closed under the relation "having the same logical form as," in that, if an argument is classified as valid, then so is any other argument of the same logical form. If this is the case, then such an identification clearly presupposes, and rests on, a notion of logical form.
The question of what constitutes a good theory of logical form lies oustide the scope of this book, and hence it is not pursued any further. We shall limit ourselves to the observation that one can achieve the desired closure conditions by requiring that the class of valid arguments be generated in some uniform way from some restricted set of principles. For instance, Aristotle's theory of the syllogism accomplishes this in a characteristically elegant fashion. It classifies: subject-predicate propositions on the basis of their forms into a small number of classes, and one then generates syllogisms by allowing the two premises and the conclusion to take all possible forms.
The second part of the task, however, is much harder. Once a class of arguments is identified, one naturally wants to know what it is that makes these arguments valid. In other words, to accomplish this second task, one needs a general theory of logical consequence, a theory that was not only unavailable to the ancients, but that would not be available until the appearance of modern symbolic logic -when an effort was undertaken to formalize and represent mathematical reasoning -and that would not be completely developed until the middle of the twentieth century. It is only with the development of the first general accounts of the notion of logical consequence through the work of Alfred Tarski (Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, 1935 ) that modern symbolic logic reaches maturity.
One of the salient features of such an account is a property known as monotony, according to which the set of conclusions logically following from a given body of knowledge grows proportionally to the body of knowledge itself. In other words, once a given conclusion has been reached, it cannot be "undone" by the addition of any amount of further information. This is a desirable trait if the relation of logical consequence
